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Modeling the IMF’s Statistical Discrepancy in the
Global Current Account
JAIME MARQUEZ and LISA WORKMAN*
This paper offers a framework for judging when the discrepancy embodied in current
account forecasts is large. The first step in implementing this framework involves
developing an econometric model explaining the components of the aggregate discrep-
ancy, estimating the associated parameters, and generating the aggregate discrep-
ancy’s conditional expectation. The second step is to compare this model-based
forecast with the discrepancy embodied in countries’current-account forecasts. If the
gap in discrepancies is below a critical value, then the discrepancy embodied in the
countries’current account forecasts is not large. Otherwise, the discrepancy is large
and calls for a careful reexamination of the associated current account forecasts. 
[JEL C52, F33]
F
or projections of global external imbalances to be useful, they must be inter-
nally consistent: external surpluses and deficits across countries must add up
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to zero. That this adding-up condition does not hold in the data need not, by itself,
undermine the usefulness of these projections: reporting mistakes, sampling
errors, and recording asymmetries across countries are a fact of life and, when
combined, they give rise to a statistical discrepancy. But when this discrepancy
reaches the level of the current account surplus of Japan in 1990 ($100 billion),
and is projected to reach almost $300 billion by 2001 (Figure 1), one cannot avoid
questioning the usefulness of such projections.
Sustained discrepancies of this magnitude are worrisome because they under-
mine the credibility of global current account forecasts. Specifically, if the
discrepancy stems from recording practices of a few countries, then their forecasts
for growth could be systematically mismeasured with obvious implications for the
global consistency of individual country forecasts of the current account. Such
consistency is central to studying, for example, which countries will absorb the
reduction of the U.S. external deficit.
One tempting response to this statistical discrepancy is to develop a rule to
allocate it across countries. Years of work by the IMF suggest, however, that
reliance on such rules might further distort the countries’ current account fore-
casts.1 Indeed, the evolution of this discrepancy has no obvious statistical pattern
and, thus, an allocation rule suitable for one year need not work in other years.
Moreover, movements in the statistical discrepancy reflect large and often mutu-
ally offsetting movements in its components. This property creates the impression
of improved accuracy when just the opposite is true (Figure 2). Thus using a rule
to allocate the discrepancy over 1993–97 would reallocate small amounts—
precisely the opposite of what is needed.
Facing sustained and large discrepancies in the global current account with no
reliable allocation rule leaves practitioners with two courses of action: either
ignore the discrepancy and the internal consistency of global forecasts or reex-
amine the associated current account forecasts if the implied discrepancy is, in
some sense, large. In other words, if we denote Ci as the current account forecast
for the ith country, then Dc = Σ ∀ iCi is the current account discrepancy associated
with those forecasts and the question is whether Dc is large enough to merit a revi-
sion of the underlying Cis.
Determining whether Dc is large involves specifying a reference value and this
paper offers a practical approach to determining it. Specifically, as reference value
we choose the expected value of the discrepancy. This choice allows us to define
a discrepancy as large if it is significantly different from its conditional expecta-
tion. Implementing this choice involves developing an econometric model to
generate the distribution of the discrepancy and Sections II–IV of this paper docu-
ment the associated modeling aspects: level of disaggregation, functional form,
explanatory variables, and estimation method.
1The chief study on the global current account discrepancy is the 1987 Report on the World Current
Account Discrepancy (IMF, 1987), which focuses on the 1983 discrepancy; its findings have been
confirmed in IMF (1996, 1999a, 1999b). The appendix uses a hypothetical example to highlight the poten-















Figure 1.  World Current-Account Discrepancy
US$billion
1972 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 2000
Percent of World Imports
1972 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 2000
Forecasts*
Source: *World Economic Outlook, May 2000.      
Figure 2. World Current-Account Discrepancy by Categories














Investment IncomeTo evaluate the usefulness of the model, Section III asks whether it can detect
large discrepancies when large discrepancies are known to occur: not being able
to detect a known significant change would question the model’s usefulness. As a
test case we use the switch in Europe’s trade methodology in 1993, which is
acknowledged to be responsible for large discrepancies (IMF, 1997, p. 9). We then
generate ex ante forecasts of the discrepancy through 2001 and compare them
against those reported in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook for May 2000. The
model identifies the discrepancy in that report as large and calls for a rethinking
of the country-based forecasts.
I. Model Design
Aggregation
The model explains the global current account discrepancy, D, as the sum of the
discrepancies in four global accounts:
(1)
where q is a vector of explanatory variables, Dg is the global discrepancy in the
trade account, Di is the global discrepancy in the investment-income account, Ds
is the global discrepancy in the service account, and Du is the global discrepancy
in the unrequited-transfers account.
The alternative to explaining the accounts’ discrepancies is to develop a
single-equation model for the overall discrepancy, as in Sheets (1998). A single
equation is appealing because of its simplicity but it suffers from aggregation
pitfalls. Specifically, the global discrepancy might be zero not because of accurate
recordings but because discrepancies in various accounts are mutually offsetting
(see Figure 2). Coefficient estimates of a single equation would then reflect the
happenstance of inaccurate recordings whereas coefficient estimates for separate
equations would avoid them.
Analytical Framework
We differentiate between actual and recorded transactions. Let actual global
credits in a given account be Xa and actual global debits be Ma, where a = g, i, s, u.
Whereas Xa ≡ Ma, the corresponding recorded measures need not be identical:
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the error in debits. The global discrepancy in that account is:
To translate this accounting identity into a statistical model, we postulate that
exa = exa(q, ua) and ema = ema (q, va) where ua and va are random variables. Thus:
We now assume that:
where Mw  is recorded world imports and wa is a random variable. With this
assumption, we model the importance of a statistical discrepancy as:
which is nonlinear in the variables included in q.
To illustrate the key features of our approach, assume the simplest formulation:
Then:
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in the first place: reporting mistakes and sampling errors. In the absence of these
factors, the actual and the recorded transactions would be equal to each other and
there would be no statistical discrepancy. The term in square brackets embodies
the factors that account for movements in the (scaled) discrepancy. For example,
if q1t is a variable capturing behavioral incentives to misreport by one of the trans-
actors, then changes in those incentives will induce nonlinear changes in the
account’s statistical discrepancy.2
Statistical Framework
Our modeling recognizes the roles of simultaneity and dynamics. Simultaneity
considerations arise because international transactions are recorded using the prin-
ciple of double entry. This principle requires recording two accounts simultane-
ously and, thus, discrepancies in one account could reflect mismeasurements from
another.3
Dynamic considerations might arise because faulty recording practices are




where A0 is a 4   4 matrix of coefficients recognizing the role of simultaneity; Λ t
is the 4   1 vector of discrepancies to be modeled (Λ   = (Dg , Di , Ds, Du); A1 is
a 4   4 matrix of coefficients capturing the importance of dynamic considerations;
B is a 4   n matrix of coefficients; Qt is the vector of explanatory variables
consisting of the entries in qt as well as nonlinear terms (more below); Ut is the
vector of disturbances distributed as IN(0, Ω Ut); and 1  is a vector of ones.
The reduced form implied by equation (2) is:
(4)
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2Our working paper documents how we apply this framework to deriving estimating equations for
each account’s discrepancy; see http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2000/678/ifdp678.pdf.
3For example, a donor country may record the value of a transfer as both a credit (such as merchan-
dise exports for aid) and as a debit (unrequited transfer). The recipient country might debit the trade
account (e.g., merchandise imports) and credit the capital account (e.g., capital inflow) instead of cred-
iting unrequited transfers.where Π d = A0
–1 ⋅ A1, Π q = A0
–1 ⋅ B, and Vt = A0
–1 ⋅  Ut ~ N(0, Ω Vt). Section III uses
the Full Information Maximum Likelihood method (FIML) for parameter estima-
tion and the implements dynamic simulations to estimate the expected global
discrepancy at time t as:
(6)
where a circumflex denotes an estimated magnitude. Note that Ê(Dt) is condi-
tioning on the model’s own generated values for the lagged endogenous variables
and not on historical values. The estimate of the variance of the discrepancy at
time t is:
(7)
Note that vâr(Dt) varies with changes in the explanatory variables. Furthermore,
reliance on FIML allows for the correlations across the residuals of the model to
affect vâr(Dt).
One can use these equations to test whether the discrepancy embodied in
countries’ current account forecasts, D
c
t, is large. Specifically, the null and alter-
native hypotheses are:
and
and the test statistic is:
If Vt ~ N(0, Ω V), then finding that |τ | > 2 means that D
c
t is statistically different
from its expected value at the 5 percent significance level. We interpret such a
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Selection of Explanatory Variables
Looking to economic theory for what variables to include in q is not fruitful here
because there is no economic theory of current account discrepancies as such.
Thus to select the explanatory variables, we identify the forces responsible for
each account’s discrepancy and then translate those forces into a list of macroeco-
nomic variables.4 This approach yields too many variables to consider and thus, to
discriminate among them, we invoke additional criteria. First, the data must be
available on a timely basis. Arguing that a variable should be included in a model
because its coefficient is highly significant loses its force if the associated data are
available with a long delay. Second, given the annual frequency of observations,
the number of explanatory variables should be as small as possible. Third, gener-
ating a forecast of q should not be more difficult than generating forecasts of the
discrepancies directly. Finally, the estimation results cannot violate the maintained
assumptions for the residuals. These assumptions are central to the definition of a
large discrepancy.
Discrepancies in trade 
The factors responsible for a discrepancy in the global trade account are trans-
portation delays, asymmetric valuations, and quality differentials in recording
practices. Transportation delays in shipping merchandise imply that recorded
increases in export credits are not accompanied by simultaneous recorded
increases in import debits. To translate the role of these shipment delays into an
explanatory variable, we assume that fluctuations in world trade are driven by
fluctuations in economic activity. Thus faster world growth raises recorded exports
ahead of recorded imports and raises net credits in the global trade balance.
Asymmetric valuations arise whenever different prices are used to value the
same transaction. For example, recipients of oil subsidies from the Organization
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) could record oil imports (debits) at
the subsidized price whereas OPEC could record the corresponding oil exports
(credits) at the market price. In that case, debits would increase less than credits
thus inducing a discrepancy in the global trade account. Another example involves
the use of different exchange rates to value the same transaction by at least one of
the reporting countries. To model these valuation asymmetries we use the price of
oil as a proxy for commodity prices, and the U.S. federal funds rate as a proxy for
Jaime Marquez and Lisa Workman
506
4Idiosyncratic recording practices can also induce discrepancies. For example, Bermuda, the Cayman
Islands, and Hong Kong SAR combine direct-investment income with other income measures. Similarly,
Middle Eastern oil exporters do not report cross-border investment income of private nonbanks (IMF,
1987, pp. 57–58). By their nature, idiosyncratic factors lack an obvious representation in terms of a
macroeconomic variable.exchange rates. The alternative of including in q the numerous exchange rates
would exhaust the degrees of freedom.
Differentials in recording quality across countries might help explain move-
ments in the discrepancies. Specifically, if countries with high-quality data
increase their share of world trade, then one would expect a reduction in the
existing trade discrepancy. To model this possibility, we assume that the United
States is the high-quality data country and postulate that if the U.S. share of
world imports increases, then there would be a reduction of net credits in the
trade discrepancy, all else given. A more concrete example of the role of quality
involves the change in methodologies for collecting intra–European Union (EU)
trade data by the EU in 1993: a switch from custom records to value-added tax
records (IMF, 1997, p. 9). The IMF estimates that this switch induced an excess
of credits over debits of $40 billion a year (IMF, 1999a, p. 4). We model this
effect with a dummy variable.5
Discrepancies in investment income
Discrepancies in this account reflect misrecordings in portfolio-investment
income and direct-investment income. These discrepancies stem from incentives
to understate capital outflows, the growth of offshore financial centers, and
recording idiosyncrasies.6 The incentive to underreport capital outflows arises
from tax avoidance on the corresponding income. This tax-evasion incentive leads
to an underreporting of investment income because accounting practices use
cumulated capital outflows to estimate the corresponding stock of claims on
foreigners, which is then used to compute investment income. Thus understating
capital outflows translates into understating the associated income. To model this
factor, we assume that an increase in the U.S. federal funds rate accentuates the
incentive to understate capital outflows, which results in an underestimate of the
stock of claims on foreigners and the resulting investment income.
The growth of offshore financial centers is contributing to the discrepancy in
investment income by undermining the ability of statistical agencies to track finan-
cial transactions. Specifically, such centers are largely unrelated to domestic activ-
ities of the host country and typically do not have to report to the host’s statistical
agencies.7 Also, the associated transactions involve securitization with numerous
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5To investigate this possibility further, we use the IMF’s Direction of Trade that reports bilateral trade
data. We then compute intra-EU credits and debits and find a sharp increase in net credits starting in 1993.
As a fraction of EU imports from their members, the discrepancy increases from about 1 percent prior to
1993 to 7.3 percent in 1993. This gap reaches a maximum of 9.3 percent in 1996.
6Portfolio income includes interest payments/receipts among banks, interest and dividends on securi-
ties, commercial paper, mortgages, and supplier credits. Direct-investment income includes earnings of
foreign subsidiaries, earnings of unincorporated business in foreign countries, and interest of foreign-
incorporated affiliates and branches. The bulk of these discrepancies stems from discrepancies in port-
folio-investment income.
7The new offshore financial centers are located in Hong Kong SAR, Singapore, Bahrain, the
Bahamas, Cayman Islands, and Panama; Bahrain’s operations are recorded in that country’s statistics.
These centers offer unregulated operations and tax advantages not offered by traditional centers (e.g., New
York, London, and Zurich).participants, not all of whom report to any national compilers.8 Expecting finan-
cial innovation to grow over time, we use a trend to capture the effect of this
process on the discrepancy.
Recording idiosyncrasies come in two flavors: misclassifications and asym-
metries. Misclassifications arise from the ambiguity of the term lasting interest,
which is the criterion used for classifying foreign direct investment. This ambi-
guity has led some countries to record reinvested earnings as a capital inflow from
the parent company (IMF, 1987, p. 36) and not as investment income.9
Asymmetries arise from cross-country differences in recording practices for a
given transaction. (See footnote 3.) Given that both misclassifications and asym-
metries reflect institutional practices, we model the persistence of errors they
induce by including the lag of the discrepancy of the investment income account
as an explanatory variable.
Discrepancy in services
The discrepancy in services arises from misrecordings in travel expenses, ship-
ping, and other transportation services. This discrepancy is declining but that trend
conceals the growing importance of errors in shipping (Table 1).10
Given that most countries have good records of their payments to foreign ship-
pers, the discrepancy arises from underreporting of revenue by ship operators.
Indeed, ship operators of the world’s largest fleets claim Greece, Hong Kong SAR,
and countries in Eastern Europe as residence, but these economies do not report
such earnings to the IMF (IMF, 1996, p. 146).11
To model this discrepancy we assume (i) that shippers seek to avoid income
taxes and thus underreport their shipping revenues and (ii) that their propensity to
underreport is directly related to the price of oil. We use this price because oil is
an important commodity in maritime transportation and because the price of oil is
correlated with the prices of other raw materials.12
Counteracting the effects of underreporting credits is the adoption of alterna-
tive modes of transportation. Specifically, declines in the physical weight of prod-
ucts allow their transportation using the growing air fleet. The associated tight
security procedures virtually guarantee that all the items transported are accounted
Jaime Marquez and Lisa Workman
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8Securitization takes place when direct loans by banks are replaced by underwriting commitments
that do not appear on banks’ balance sheets.
9The IMF’s approach to measuring reinvested earnings requires direct questioning of multinational
enterprises, which is difficult given the resources available. Because of these difficulties, the IMF recom-
mends dropping this account from the global sum of investment-income accounts (IMF, 1987, p. 43).
10Shipment debits include the cost of freight, insurance, and those distribution services paid by the
importer; shipment credits include gross revenue on freight earned by vessels operated by residents of the
reporting country regardless of the flag registry of the vessel.
11Moreover, the Greek balance of payments excludes the operations of the Greek fleet because the
owners of that fleet do not reside in Greece and, as far as the IMF is aware, they are not residents in other
countries either (IMF, 1987, p. 90).
12We also considered the IMF’s Commodity Price Index, but we did not find it to exert a significant
influence on the behavior of discrepancies.for, leaving little room for misreporting. To the extent that the decline in physical
weight of products will continue, we use a time trend to capture how substitution
away from maritime shipping reduces the scope for underreporting export
services.
Discrepancies in unrequited transfers 
Discrepancies in transfers arise from two sources: the recording asymmetries of
workers’ remittances and the exclusion of the intermediation by international
donor organizations from balance of payments accounts. Asymmetries in
recording remittances arise when (i) the host country treats temporary workers as
residents, recording their remittances as unrequited transfers; and (ii) the country
of origin also treats these workers as residents, recording their remittances not as
unrequited transfers but as service exports (IMF, 1987, p. 104).
Intermediation by international donor agencies are excluded from countries’
balance of payments because these agencies are not considered residents of any
country; some of these agencies report to the IMF. As long as this intermedia-
tion operates without delays, the transaction by itself does not generate a statis-
tical discrepancy. Over a given horizon, however, these institutions receive
contributions for assistance in excess of their disbursements. The shortfall in
disbursements is not recorded because these international institutions do not
conform to the principle of residency (IMF, 1987, p. 103), giving rise to the
account’s discrepancy.
A convenient way of modeling this feature is to recognize that if the share of
intermediation by international institutions declines, then so will the discrepancy
it induces. The share of intermediation declines when donor countries provide
their assistance directly to recipient countries and avoid the side effects of the
intermediary role of international institutions (delays and residency). To this end
we assume that OPEC members, who have been important donors in the past, are
more likely to be donor countries the higher the price of oil. An increase in that
price would, if we are correct, translate into greater assistance from OPEC, a
reduction in the intermediation from international institutions, and a decline in the
excess of debits over credits in transfers.
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Table 1. Discrepancies in Services Account 
(in billions of U.S. dollars)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Services –44.1 –28.1 –18.3 –4.0 –13.1 –1.3 16.6 12.0
Shipping –50.6 –53.0 –55.8 –55.7 –66.3 –63.6 –64.8 –60.9
Source: IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics.Summary
Table 2 lists the factors we have identified to explain movements in the various
discrepancies. This list is what we denoted as q:
where dY/Y is world growth, Po is the nominal price of oil, R is the nominal U.S.
federal funds rate, Mus is the U.S. share in world imports, and dum is a dummy for
European trade. To recognize the role of nonlinearities, we expand this list to
include the squares of the price of oil and the interest rate as well as the interac-
tions between these two variables and the trend. The resulting list of explanatory
variables is denoted as Q:
We want to emphasize that Table 2 does not offer a list of zero restrictions on the
coefficients of the reduced form. The simultaneous character of the model allows
all exogenous variables to affect the discrepancies in all of the accounts and our
statistical analysis allows for that possibility.
Parameter Estimation
Based on annual data from 1972 to 1998, Table 3 shows the least-squares esti-
mates for the unrestricted reduced form, equation (4). The results reveal numerous
t-ratios below the 5 percent critical value, which is not surprising given the rela-
tively small number of degrees of freedom. Second, the maintained assumptions
for the residuals are supported empirically.13
Using a log-likelihood ratio test, we eliminate variables that are not jointly
significant and reestimate the parameters of the restricted reduced form using
FIML. According to the estimates, the data support the maintained assumptions
for the residuals (Table 4) but persistence effects are small and limited to discrep-
ancies in transfers.
Also, the dummy for the switch in European data methods is positive and
significant, and suggests that the switch of recording practices of Europe raised the
trade discrepancy by about 0.9 percentage points of world imports. The coefficient
Q q P R P trend R trend oo '' . =⋅ ⋅ ( ) Intercept 22
q dYY P R M dum trend ou s '/ , = ( )
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13We test for joint normality using the Jarque-Bera test; the statistic is distributed as χ 2(n⋅ 2) where n
is the number of equations. We test for joint serial independence with an F-test for the hypothesis that the
coefficients for a VAR(1) of the estimation residuals are jointly equal to zero. We applied an ARCH test
to each equation separately and the results cannot reject (not shown) the hypothesis of homoskedasticity.
See Hendry and Doornik (1996) for details.for the trend is positive and significant for services: the underreporting of credits
due to maritime shipping is ameliorated by the growing role played by the alter-
natives to maritime shipping.
Nonlinearities (interactions and squared terms) have statistically significant
coefficients, which call for model simulations to evaluate the effects of changes in
the remaining variables; we use one-year shocks evaluated in 1998. Based on these
simulations, a 10 percent increase in the price of oil lowers net credits in the global
discrepancy by 0.03 percent of world imports (Table 5). This small effect reflects
offsetting responses from the various accounts. An increase of the federal funds
rate by 1 percentage point lowers net credits in the discrepancies for investment
income and services; net credits in the overall discrepancy decline by 0.24 percent
of world imports or about $13 billion. Raising the world’s growth rate by 1
percentage point increases net credits in the trade discrepancy: faster growth accel-
erates trade and accentuates the extent to which trade credits are recorded ahead
of trade debits. The overall discrepancy experiences an increase in net credits of
0.64 percentage points of world imports or about $35 billion.
An increase of the U.S. share of world imports by 1 percentage point reduces
net credits in the trade discrepancy by 0.25 percent of world imports ($14 billion)
given that a greater fraction of world trade is being recorded by the country with
the high-quality data. Higher U.S. imports also affect the investment income
discrepancy given that financing an increase of U.S. imports involves an increase
in foreign capital outflows. The underreporting of these outflows accentuates the
understating of claims of the rest of the world on the United States and the asso-
ciated interest receipts. Finally, to the extent that a fraction of the increase in U.S.
imports is transported by the U.S. fleet, shipping credits that would not have been
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Table 2. Factors Explaining the Global Discrepancies
Variables: q Factor Modeled Account
World growth: dY/Y Recording delays Trade
Oil prices: Po Valuation asymmetries Trade
Tax evasion Services
Disbursement delays Transfers
U.S. interest rate: R Tax evasion Investment income
Valuation asymmetries Trade
U.S. share of world 
imports: Mus Quality differentials in data Trade
Trend Financial globalization Investment income
Transportation technology Services
Dummy Europe: dum Methodological changes Traderecorded are now being reported with an increase in net credits of the service
discrepancy. Figure 3 compares historical values against model predictions.14
Judging by the mean absolute errors (MAE), either as a percentage of world
imports and in U.S. dollars, the predictions of the model are close to historical
values and the residuals are not one-sided. The exception is the transfer equation,
which shows systematic deviations during the 1990s.
III. Model Applications
For the model developed here to be useful, it should detect large discrepancies
when large discrepancies are known to occur. According to the IMF
Jaime Marquez and Lisa Workman
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Table 3. Estimates of Unrestricted Reduced Form—OLS: 1972–98
Trade Dgt Services Dst Investment Dit Transfers Dut
Dg,t–1 0.15 –0.26 –0.19 0.04
Ds,t–1 0.02 –0.06 0.08 0.46*
Di,t–1 –0.12 0.54 0.24 –0.12
Du,t–1 –0.29 –0.24 0.31 1.05*
dY/Y 0.37* –0.03 0.26* 0.01
Po –0.24* –0.11 0.15 0.03
R –0.49 0.50 0.57 0.09
Mus –0.19 0.17 –0.34* –0.04
Trend –0.07 0.18 0.12 –0.04
dum 0.63 0.06 0.58 0.17
Po2 0.01* 0.00 –0.004 0.003
R2 0.02* –0.01 –0.012 –0.01
Po   trend 0.00 0.003 –0.003 0.00
R   trend 0.01 –0.02 –0.02 –0.002
Intercept 6.67* –5.70* 0.14 0.71
SER 0.297 0.354 0.337 0.181
*t-ratio above the 5 percent level. Po = oil price; R = federal funds rate; dY/Y = world growth;
dum = dummy for European trade; and Mus = U.S. share in world imports.
Hypothesis Testing
Null Hypothesis Test Statistic Result (p-level)
Residuals are jointly normal χ 2(8) 11.845 (0.16)
Residuals are jointly serially independent F(16, 12) 1.54 (0.23)








q ⋅ Qt and thus we use the model’s own predictions for the
lagged endogenous variables instead of the historical values. We also examined one-step, out of sample,
predictions over 1996–98; the results are comparable to those reported here.(IMF, 1997, p. 9), the change in European methodology for collecting trade data
induced a major increase in the trade discrepancy, and the question is whether the
model detects it as such. Thus, the null and alternative hypotheses are:
and
HE D D tt
c
0: ( ) =
MODELING THE IMF’S STATISTICAL DISCREPANCY
513
Table 4. Estimates of Restricted Reduced Form—FIML: 1972–981
Trade Dgt Services Dst Investment Dit Transfers Dut
Dg,t–1 —— — —
Ds,t–1 —— — 0.35 (0.08)
Di,t–1 — 0.25 (0.11) ——
Du,t–1 —— — 0.84 (0.1)
dY/Y 0.40 (0.03) — 0.23 (0.06) —
Po –0.20 (0.03) –0.11 (0.02) 0.11 (0.04) —
R –0.07 (0.03) 0.14 (0.06) 0.23 (0.03) —
Mus –0.25 (0.04) 0.13 (0.06) –0.30 (0.06) —
Trend — 0.09 (0.03) —– 0.02 (0.01)
dum 0.86 (0.03) — 0.58 (0.18) —
Po2 0.005 (0.0006) —– 0.003 (0.001) 0.0007
(0.0001)
R2 —— — —
Po  trend — 0.005 (0.001) ——
R   trend 0.004 (0.001) –0.01 (0.004) –0.01 (0.002) —
Intercept 5.56 (0.62) –3.4 (1.15) 1.11 (0.70) 0.34 (0.25)
SER 0.281 0.339 0.329 0.173
1Entries in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. Po = oil price; R =
federal funds rate; dY/Y = world growth; dum = dummy for European trade; and Mus = U.S. share
in world imports.
Hypothesis Testing
Null Hypothesis Test Statistic Result (p-level)
Residuals are jointly normal χ 2(8) 3.57 (0.89)
Residuals are jointly serially independent F(16, 37) 0.84 (0.64)
Overidentifying restrictions hold χ 2(31) 34.57 (0.30)where D
c
t is the observed value for the discrepancy at date t, t = 1993–98. A rejec-
tion of the null hypothesis means that the model identifies as large the change in
European methods to collect data.
Being able to identify statistically large discrepancies is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition to judge the model’s usefulness. Specifically, this switch is cred-
ited with an increase in net credits of the trade discrepancy. Thus, model predictions
that do not use post-1992 data for parameter estimation should understate net credits
in the trade discrepancy. Also, the recorded increase in the trade discrepancy tended
to offset the discrepancy in investment income (see Figure 2) and induced a seem-
ingly small recorded global discrepancy. Thus, model predictions that exclude the
switch should show a worsening of the global discrepancy. Finally, we need
evidence of stability in the model’s parameters to avoid confusing the effects of
parameter instability with the effects of changes in data collection methods.
To implement the test, we start by estimating the model’s parameters with data
through 1992, which excludes post-switch observations. Comparing the estima-
tion results with those based on the full sample reveals that both sets of parameter
estimates are virtually identical (Table 6). With one exception, neither sign nor
statistical significance of the estimates change, as a result of using the shorter
sample.15Also, the maintained assumptions for the residuals are supported empir-
ically. Moreover, relative to the parameters of the unrestricted reduced form esti-
mated with data through 1992, the log-likelihood ratio test does not reject the same
set of zero restrictions. Overall, this evidence rules out parameter instability as a
factor in a finding of large discrepancies.16
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Table 5. Responses to Exogenous Shocks1
Shock→∆ Po ∆ R ∆ dY/Y ∆ Mus
↓ Response
∆ Dgt –0.10 0.03 0.40 –0.25
∆ Dit 0.03 –0.12 0.23 –0.30
∆ Dst 0.02 –0.15 0.00 0.13
∆ Dut 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
∆ D –0.03 –0.24 0.64 –0.42
1Fraction of world imports in 1998 ($5,543 billion; IMF, International Financial Statistics,
September 1999).
15The exception is the coefficient for interaction of trend and oil prices in the service equation: signif-
icant with the full sample and insignificant otherwise.
16We examined the sensitivity of the estimated parameters (unconstrained and restricted reduced
forms) to using the London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) on six-month instruments instead of the U.S.
federal funds rate. We find that the point estimates are quite robust but the zero restrictions for the shorter
sample are rejected for the model based on the LIBOR. Thus one cannot determine whether ex post tests
from the LIBOR-based model are due to parameter instability.Given the coefficient estimates, we use dynamic simulations to generate
predictions for 1993–98, with 1992 as the initial condition:
and
where the subscript s denotes that the estimates use the short sample (1972–92). If
ˆ ' ˆ , ED t tt ( ) =⋅ = − 1 1993 98 Λ for 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ΛΠΛ Π t sd ts q t Q =⋅+⋅ − 1
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1972 75 78 81 84 87 90 93 96
1972 75 78 81 84 87 90 93 96
1972 75 78 81 84 87 90 93 96




0   
Simulated Actualthen the observed discrepancy differs significantly from its expected value and we
interpret this result as a large discrepancy.
Figure 4 reports the results, which reveal statistically significant underpredic-
tions in the trade discrepancy and overprediction for the overall discrepancy, just
as one expects. Overall, the results show that the model’s confidence intervals are
narrow enough to detect the European switch in data recording procedures as a
major development. By itself, this finding does not constitute an endorsement of
the approach. However, not being able to identify a known significant change
would question its usefulness.
DE D D t
c
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Table 6. Parameter Estimates with FIML, 1972–98 and 1972–92
Trade Dgt Services Dst Investment Dit Transfers Dut
72–98 72–92 72–98 72–92 72–98 72–92 72–98 72–92
Dg,t–1 —— — — —— — —
Ds,t–1 —— —— —— 0.35 0.35
Di,t–1 —— 0.25* 0.33* ——— —
Du,t–1 —— — — —— 0.84* 0.84*
R   trend 0.004* 0.004* –0.01* –0.01* –0.01* –0.01* ——
Trend —— 0.09* 0.17* —— – 0.02* –0.02*
Po –0.20* –0.25* –0.11* –0.07* 0.11* 0.20* ——
Po2 0.005* 0.01* —— – 0.003* –0.005* 0.0007* 0.0007*
R –0.07* –0.10* 0.14* 0.16* 0.23* 0.25* ——
dY/Y 0.40* 0.36* —— 0.23* 0.30* ——
Po   trend —— 0.005* 0.001 ——— —
Mus –0.25* –0.21* 0.13* 0.16* –0.30* –0.32* ——
Intercept 5.56* 5.83* –3.4* –4.44* 1.11 0.45 0.34 0.36
SER 0.281 0.294 0.339 0.356 0.329 0.331 0.173 0.183
*Statistical significance at the 5 percent level.
Hypothesis Testing with Observations Ending in 1992
Null Hypothesis Test Statistic Result (p-level)
Vector of residuals is normal χ 2(8) 8.19 (0.41)
Vector of residuals is serially independent F(16, 22) 1.77 (0.11)
Overidentifying restrictions hold χ 2(29) 41.14 (0.07)We now test whether the IMF’s figures for the overall discrepancy over
1999–2001 are large. To this end we use the IMF’s extrapolations for the exoge-
nous variables (Table 7).17 The results suggest that the IMF’s current account
predictions embody a global discrepancy D
c
t that is significantly different from our
model’s expectation of that discrepancy, E
^(Dt) (Figure 5). This finding calls,
according to our approach, for a rethinking of the current account forecasts for the
individual countries.
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Figure 4.  95 percent Confidence Bands for Forecast Discrepancies, 1993–98
(percent of World Imports)
1992 94 96 98
1992 94 96 98
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1992 94 96 98
17We apply the growth rates for oil prices reported on IMF (2000, p. 277) to a 1998 oil price of $12.30
a barrel. For the interest rate, we combine the projections for the real world long-term interest rate (IMF,
2000, p. 277) with the projections for U.S. CPI inflation (IMF, 2000, p. 215). For the world growth rate,
we use the projections reported on IMF (2000, p. 277).IV. Conclusions
This paper offers a framework for judging when the discrepancy embodied in
current account forecasts is large. The first step in implementing this notion is to
develop an econometric model that generates the discrepancy’s conditional expec-
tation. The second step is to compare this model-based forecast with the discrep-
ancy embodied in countries’current account forecasts. If the gap in discrepancies
is below a critical value, then the discrepancy embodied in the countries’ current
account forecasts is not large. Otherwise, the discrepancy is large and calls for a
careful reexamination of the associated current account forecasts.
Econometric modeling of these discrepancies is not the obvious first step in
addressing global discrepancies. The first obvious step is to design fixed rules to
allocate the discrepancies across countries. Though appealing, reliance on rules is
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Table 7. Assumptions for Exogenous Variables
Po
(in U.S. dollars R dY/Y
per barrel) (in percent) (in percent)
1999 17.1 5.4 3.3
2000 23.1 6.2 4.2
2001 18.7 6.3 3.9
Source: IMF (2000).
Figure 5.  95 percent Confidence Band for Forecasts of Global Discrepancy
















E(D) – 2δat odds with the large and often mutually offsetting movements in the discrepan-
cies of the components of the current account and thus might further distort coun-
tries’ current account forecasts. Econometric modeling of discrepancies, unusual
as it is, offers a well-defined framework for determining when discrepancies in the




The published data on discrepancies come from various issues of the IMF’s  Balance of
Payments Statistics. One needs to use several issues because the data are subject to large revi-
sions. For example, the value for the 1994 discrepancy ranges from –$75 billion in the 1995
data release to less than –$50 billion in the 1998 data release. Thus each observation in Figure 1
comes from the most recent release containing data for that year. The exact dates of the releases
can be found in the working paper version of this paper located at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2000/678/ifdp678.pdf
The data for the other series also come from the IMF and the corresponding locators are
given below:
Spot world U.S.$ per barrel for oil: IMF 00176AAZ
Federal funds rate: IMF 11160B
World imports: IMF 00171D
U.S. imports: IMF 11171D
GDP growth: IMF 1997 Balance of Payments Yearbook, “GDP at Constant Prices,” p. 144–45
Properties
The regressions presented earlier assume that the variables have the same degree of stationarity.
To test whether that property holds, we use an Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test with a
constant and three lags. The evidence suggests that one cannot reject the hypothesis that all of
the variables used here are integrated of order one.
Fixed Rules Allocation
We now examine the issues involved in using fixed rules to allocate the “excess” or unexpected
discrepancy among the countries and regions of interest. We start by considering hypothetical
forecasts of global current accounts (Table A1), which embody a discrepancy of –$140 billion.
Suppose now that the model predicts a global discrepancy of –$40 billion and the question is how
to allocate the excess discrepancy (–$100 billion) across the countries and regions in Table A1.
To this end, we assume that the global current account discrepancy stems from discrepan-
cies in trade, shipping, and portfolio income; we ignore discrepancies in transfers. Then we
allocate the discrepancy across countries using a list of stylized rules:
1. Take the forecast of the U.S. current account as given.
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5192. Assume that the trade discrepancy is +$40 billion (credits over debits). This estimate stems
from the underreporting of imports in Euroland’s business surveys (IMF, 1999, p. 4). Thus
we lower the balance for Euroland by $40 billion (Table A1, column 2).
3. Assume that the shipping discrepancy is –$71 billion (debits over credits, 1997 value).
Allocate this discrepancy to Eastern Europe (7 percent), Asia—as housing offshore
banking centers—(25 percent), Middle East and Africa (8 percent), and other developing
countries (60 percent). Assuming that “Other” includes Greece, we assign three-fourths of
the 60 percent to Greece (IMF, 1987, Table 72).
4. Assume that the portfolio income discrepancy is –$68 billion (debits over credits), which
is half of the reported 1997 discrepancy; we use half of the income discrepancy to keep the
overall discrepancy in the target range of $40 billion. Allocate the –$68 billion discrepancy
as follows: 50 percent to industrial countries (25 percent for Japan and 25 percent for
Euroland), 6 percent to Middle East and Africa, 18 percent to Asia, and 26 percent
distributed evenly between “Other” and Latin America (IMF, 1987, Table 56).
Column 6 reports the final current account forecasts after the adjustments. The main change is
the increase in the surplus of “Other” industrial countries due to the allocation of shipping
exports to Greece. Otherwise, the allocation leaves intact the surplus/deficit status of each
current account forecast.
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Table A1. Hypothetical Allocation of the 
Current Account Discrepancy for 2001
Adjustments
Total
Original Trade Shipping Inc. Adjustment Final
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
United States –422 0 0 0 0 –422
Japan 142 0 0 +17 +17 159
Euroland 145 –40 0 +17 -23 122
Other 7 0 +32 +9 +41 48
Asia 59 0 +18 +12 +30 89
Latin America –56 0 +10 +9 +19 –37
Middle East and Africa 1 0 +6 +4 +10 11
Eastern Europe –16 0 +5 0 +5 –11
Discrepancy –140 –40 +71 +68 +99 –41
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests, 1972–98
Exogenous Variables ADF Discrepancy ADF
Price of oil –1.91 Trade –1.09
Federal funds rate –1.10 Income –1.88
U.S. share of world imports –2.05 Service –0.63
World growth –2.88 Transfers –2.02
Note: 5 percent value is –2.997; 1 percent value is –3.75.Table A1 shows that allocating the excess discrepancy across countries with fixed rules is
feasible but their use suffers from three limitations: ambiguities, disincentives, and lack of
generality.
1. Ambiguities: There are many strategies to allocate the excess discrepancy, but there is no
generally accepted method to discriminate among them. This ambiguity is not the result of
using the model to estimate the expected discrepancy but rather stems from the abundance
of degrees of freedom available in an exercise that allocates a whole to many parts.
2. Disincentives: If economists’ forecasts of current accounts are bypassed by a fixed rule,
then these economists could lose interest in forecast accuracy as their predictions can be
overruled by the rule. Even if these economists do not lose their incentives, they will face
a harder than needed task in trying to account for (and reduce) that forecast error. Indeed,
fixed rules do not revise the paths for the forcing variables but rather the forecasts them-
selves, making detection of the source of the forecast error all that much harder.
3. Lack of generality: Organizational differences across institutions give rise to different allo-
cation rules to accommodate institutional idiosyncrasies. What is suited to the IMF’s
purposes need not be suitable for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development or the World Bank.
These limitations are not meant to suggest that reallocation is not needed but, rather, to suggest
that using a fixed rule is fraught with pitfalls that do not necessarily enhance forecast accuracy.
There is a need to reallocate an excess discrepancy, but this process needs to be tailored to the
particulars of the institution such as forecast assumptions, regional aggregates, and other
features that might be pertinent. Our paper is not a contribution on how to allocate a discrep-
ancy but rather on how much needs to be reallocated and, in this task, we hope the results of
the paper are of general interest.
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